报告时间：2021年9月9日(周四) 8:00-10:00
报告地点：腾讯会议 ID: 882 4461 9458
主办单位：太阳成集团tyc9728太阳成集团tyc9728
报告人简介：
Guangzhi Shang is Jim Moran Associate Professor of Operations Management in the Department of Business Analytics, Information Systems, and Supply Chain at Florida State University. His research has been published in Production and Operations Management (POM), Journal of Operations Management (JOM), and Decision Sciences (DS), among others, and recognized by best paper awards at POM, JOM, and POM Society’s College of Operational Excellence. He serves as the co-Department-Editor for the Empirical Research Methods Department at JOM and for the Retail Operations Department at DS. His review service is recognized by the 2019 outstanding reviewer award of DS and the 2018 best reviewer award of the Journal of Operations Management. He was also nominated for the best reviewer for POM and best associate editor for JOM. Heco-produces a column together with Mike Galbreth and Mark Ferguson in the Reverse Logistics Magazine named “View from Academia,”aimed at disseminating fresh-off-the-press academic knowledge among industry professionals dealing with consumer returns.
内容简介：
Since 2017, the Bitcoin blockchain system has experienced 105 fork divergences. The rapidly increasing blockchain forks have resulted in fierce competition and created significant controversies in blockchain community. To analyze this competitive aspect, we consider blockchain as a two-sided platform that serves both customers and miners. We develop a game-theoretic model to investigate how a blockchain platform’s decision on its settings, such as block size and transaction fee, affects the competition between blockchain platforms as well as the participation behavior of customers and miners. Our findings suggest that increasing the transaction fee alleviates congestion on the platform when customers have a relatively balanced need between efficiency and safety. In contrast, it induces congestion when efficiency is valued over safety. In addition, under hard fork competition, the difference in blockchain platforms’block sizes directs the attention of miners towards different types of mining rewards. Moreover, it also affects the optimal types of customers the blockchain platforms should target. Furthermore, we find that the degree of congestion and the risk attitudes of participants play vital roles in differentiating different block-sized platforms’ optimal transaction fees. We provide empirical evidence on the theoretical findings and practical implications for blockchain platform competition with respect to the behaviors of platform participants.
